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MANDEVILLE'S
CONTEMPORARY CRITICS
J. Martin Stafford

^

y

or nearly two hundred years after his death in 1733,
Bernard Mandeville received little avowed or sustained attention from English writers. In the nine
teenth centuiy his reputation was particularly low: in
his Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy (1830) Sir James
Mackintosh dismissed him in a single line as "the buffoon and sophister
of the alehouse."^ F. B. Kaye's monumental edition of the Fable was
published in 1924; but no book-length study devoted exclusively to his
thought was published in England between George Bluet's Enquiry of
1725 and Hector Monro's The Ambivalence of Bernard Mandevilld
exactly two hundred and fifty years later. This long period of relative
neglect was in sharp contrast to the clamorous and bellicose response
which ensued upon the publication of the 1723 edition of The Fable of
the Bees. Indeed, few books have prompted so immediate and vehe
ment an outcry. Why did this book become so notorious? Who were
Mandeville's critics? What was it that so sorely provoked their
indignation? How, if at all, did Mandeville respond to their criticism?
And what is the significance of this controversy for the history of
ethics?

' This was or^inally prefixed to the seventk edition of Encydopoedia Briumnica and is reprinted
in his Miscellaneous Works, 3 vols. (London: Longman, 1846) Vol. 1, p. 70.
^ Hector Monro, The Ambivalence of Bernard Mandeville (Oxfoid: Clarendon Press, 1975).
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Mandeville himself acknowledged' that the 1714 edition of the
Fable had many enemies, but this hostility was never expressed in print.
His twentieth century editor, F. B. Kaye, knew of no reference to it
earlier than 1723^, and Mandeville says in his Vindication that the 1714
edition "was never carpt at or publickly taken notice of."' He goes on
to assert that the sole reason for the hostility to the 1723 edition was
the addition of the "Essay on Charity Schools," claiming that the 1723
edition "has many precautions which the former wanted." While I
believe this remark to be characteristically disingenuous, it may well
have been this essay, attacking as it did a powerful vested interest,'
which gave rise to the unsuccessful attempt to have the book
suppressed'. It was probably the consequent notoriety in July and
August which prompted the Lord Mayor's chaplain, Robert Burrow,
to target the Fable in his sermon preached in September at the Guildhall
chapel on the occasion of the election of the new Lord Mayor. This
sermon, delivered as it was at an important civic event and subse
quently printed as a fourpenny pamphlet, no doubt added to the book's
infamy; for in the first four months of 1724 three further critiques
made their way into the world. These were William Law's Remarks on
the Fable of the Bees (January), Richard Fiddes's Preface to his General
Treatise of Morality (February), and John Dennis's Vice and Luxury
Publick Mischiefs (April). These first four works to be published against
the Fable were written by men whose principal objections were firmly
grounded in their Christian faith: indeed, three of the four were in
holy orders.
Robert Burrow was born in London in 1690 or 1692. He entered
Queen's College Oxford on 6 March 1709 and graduated in 1711. On

' Bemaid Mandeville: The Fable of the Bees edited by F. B. Kaye, 2 voli. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1924)1.230. Hereafterreferred to as FB.
'FB, 1.230.
' J. Martin Stafford (editor. Private Vices, Publick Benefits^ The Contemporary Reception of
Bernard/fandew/Ze (SolihtdLlsmeron, 1997). Tbis volume contains, among other things, the
complete texts of the eight critical responses to the FaUe alluded to below and is hereafter
referred to as PVPB, 18.
' The Charity Schools enjoyed the staunch support of the Societies for the Reformation of
Manners, so in attacking them Mandeville was waging war on a powerful vested interest. See
Thomas A. Horn,: The Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville. (London: Macmfllan, 1978),
Chapter 1.
' See W. A. Speck, "Bernard Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury," Eighteenth Century
Studies Vol. 11 (1978) 362-74.
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7 October 1717 he was indurted as Vicar of Darrington (a parish near
Pontefraa, then in the diocese of York but now in that of Wakefielc^,
where he remained until his death in 1754. Of his Guildhall sermon
only six copies are recorded in the British Library's Eighteenth Century
Short Title Catalogue. This explains why it was omitted by Kaye from
his list of works referring to the Fable*-, for although he does not claim
that his list is exhaustive, he would hardly have excluded so significant
an item had he known of its existence. He knew, of course, that such
a sermon was preached (for Mandeville himself tells us in the para
graphs added to the preface in 1724 that the Fable "has been preach'd
against before my Lord Mayor"); he must, however, have been unaware
that it was published as a pamphlet.
William Law was born at Kings Cliffe in the north east of
Northamptonshire in 1686, the fourth of eight sons in a family of
eleven children. He entered Emmanuel College, Cambridge in 1705;
graduated B.A. in 1708; was ordained and eleaed a fellow of his college
in 1711; and received an M.A. in 1712. On the accession of George I in
1714, he declined to take the oaths of allegiance and abjuration and
throughout his life retained a sympathy for the exiled Stuart dynasty.
His high church principles also found expression in his first published
work. Three letters to the Bishop of Bangor (1717). The tract against
Mandeville was his second work. By 1727 he had entered the household
of Edward Gibbon as tutor to his son Edward, who later fathered the
famous historian, also of that same name. It was during his service to
this family that he published his best known book, A Serious Call to a
Devout and Holy Life (1729). At the end of 1740 Law returned to Kings
Cliffe, where he lived austerely, devoting himself to charitable works,
to study and to writing. He died on 9 April 1761. The following year
his copious literary output of sermons and religious tracts (including
a new impression of Remarks on the Fable of the Bees) was published in
nine volumes.
Richard Fiddes was born in 1671 at Hunmanby, near the York
shire coast between Scarborough and Bridlington. In 1687 he entered
Corpus Christi College, Oxford, but for reasons unknown transferred
in 1690 to University College, where he graduated the following year.
In 1693 he returned to Yorkshire and married. The next year he was

' FBII418-453.
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ordained and in 1696 was appointed to an undemanding but lucrative
living in a small parish in Holderness, East Yorkshire. An ailment of
the throat prompted him to seek leave of non-residence. By 1712 he
was pursuing a literary career in London (though presumably still in
receipt of the emoluments pertaining to the parish of which he was but
nominally the rector). In 1718 he published his Theologica Speculativa,
a compendium of current theology, which enjoyed some success and
secured for its author the degree of Doctor of Divinity. It was followed
in 1720 by Theologica Practica, which dealt with Christian ethics. In
1724 he published in addition to A General Treatise of Morality his life
of Cardinal Wolsey—a considerable work founded on solid research,
which of all his writings attracted most attention in his day and whose
reputation was the most enduring. As this book was more sympathetic
both to Wolsey's character and to the medieval church than was
expected of a Protestant writer, Fiddes incurred the imputation of
popery—a charge of which he sought to dear himself in a pamphlet. In
1725 he issued a prospectus for a volume of biography of Thomas More
and John Fisher (both of whom had been beheaded in the reign of
Henry VTH for refusing to recognize his divorce from Catherine of
Aragon), but his health broke down and he died in Putney before he
could bring this project to fruition.
John Dennis was born in London in 1657. He was educated at
Harrow School and entered Caius College, Cambridge in 1675. He
graduated in 1679 and took an M.A. at Trinity Hall in 1683. On his
return from a tour through France and Italy, he made the acquaintance
of leading literary and fashionable men, including the Earl of Pembroke
(to whom he later dedicated Vice and Luxury Publick Mischiefs), John
Dryden, William Congreve, and William Wycherley. Although
property inherited from his father and uncle maintained him for some
time, he later had to live by his writing. In the years around the turn
of the century he wrote a number of plays, all but one of which, Liberty
Asserted (1704), enjoyed little or no success. He also wrote various
poems. The year 1711 marked the beginning of a long and bitter
quarrel with Alexander Pope which continued with increasing acerbity
until Dennis's death in 1734. His last years were spent in increasing
dependence on the charity of patrons. He is best remembered for his
numerous works of literary criticism (including Three Letters on the
Genius and Writings of Shakespeare), now more highly esteemed than
they were in his own time. Indeed, the ridicule and abuse which he
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suffered at the hands of his contemporaries soured his temper and
rendered him a general enemy to the wits of his day—a circumstance
which perhaps explains Mandeville's brief mention of him as "a noted
Critick, who seems to hate all Books that sell."'
A further critic whose animosity to Mandeville was inspired by his
Christian faith was John Thorold (pronounced Thurrald), who was
born in 1703 the eldest son of a baronet, who was also called John. He
entered Lincoln College, Oxford in 1721, graduated in 1724, was eleaed
a fellow on 23 June of the same year but resigned his fellowship in May
of the following year and returned his year's income in conformity
with a statute which forbade a fellow to have patrimony, i.e. a large
amount of inherited property.^® He succeeded to the baronetcy in 1748
and became Sheriff of Lincolnshire in 1751. He died on 5 June, 1775.
Thorold was almost certainly the youngest of Mandeville's 'critics,
being only in his early twenties when in 1726 he wrote A Short
Examination of the Notions advanc'd in the Fable of the Bees. It is
apparent from this work that he was a very earnest and sober-minded
young man, concerned to defend the claims and promote the interests
of religion. Evidence of his life ong piety is also afforded by a remark
made by Grace Granville to Lord Lansdowne in November, 1738:
"This new star of righteousness has a very plentiful fortune....He
preaches twice a week, Mondays and Fridays, reads a chapter out of the
Bible, and then explains every verse of it."^^
These theologically inspired critics were of disparate religious,
political and philosophical convictions and of all ages: Law and Fiddes
had unambiguous high church sympathies while Thorold was an ardent
evangelical; Dennis and Fiddes had been born way back in the previous
century whereas Thorold was on the threshold of adult life. Their style
varied from even-tempered commentary to vituperative denunciation.
Their critiques appeared in short pamphlets and longer books. They
differed significantly in certain details (for example, Fiddes clearly
favored a theory of political obligation based on paternal right;"
' A Letter to Dion, 46, PVPB 599.
" Tte fellowskip wluck Ttorold resigned wassoon after awarded to Jolm Wesley, the founder
of Methodism. See Chapter XIII of Vivian Green's The Commonwealth of Lincoln College
t427-1977 (Oxford University Press, 1979).
" Lady Llanover, Autobiography and Correspondence of Mrs Ddany, II, 8) quoted by Vivian
Green, op.cit., 325.
" PVPB 127-28.
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whereas Dennis proffered an account based on contract and oath^').
Their views were, however, in one vital respect sufficiently akin to
justify their being subsumed under one category: all regarded Mandeville as openly hostile to Christianity and to the virtues it enjoins.
Since charity schools were regarded by their supporters as a particularly
effective way of promoting Christianity, Mandeville's opposition to
them was interpreted as clear evidence of this hostility. His critics'
indignation was not in the least allayed by his protestations to the
contrary in his Vindication. Moreover, they had little trouble in finding
elsewhere in the Fable sceptical and cynical passages which confirmed
their suspicions that Mandeville was less than whole-heartedly
sympathetic to the Christian orthodoxy of his day. Among the
instances which one or more of them cited are the following:
The remark in "A Search into the Nature of Society" (like
"An Essay on Charity Schools" this too was an addition to the
1723 edition) that the question which is the true religion is one
that has caused more mischief than all others together.
The ridicule in Remark N (another 1723 addition) of the
allegedly absurd phrase "certain hope." This phrase occurs
prominently in the Anglican service of burial of the dead in
reference to "a sure and certain hope of the resurreaion to
eternal life." Mandeville's derisive bantering particularly
offended William Law, who devoted an entire section of his
tract^^ to defending the phrase.
Mandeville's insistence that Christian martyrs were sustained
in their sufferings not by the supernatural assistance of divine
grace but by their own pride and stubbornness. He argued,
moreover, that there had been non-believers who had shown
no less fortitude and resolution in laying down their lives for
atheism.'^

" PVPB 147-48.
" PVPB 84-86.
" Bluet devotes consideiable space to countering this claim in Section V of his Enquiry. See
PVPB 314-25.
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Though their differences with Mandeville were real and substantial, the
bitterness of the controversy was exacerbated by a resentment fuelled
by Mandeville's language, the ironic nature and true significance of
which they often failed to appreciate. They did not share Mandeville's
professed rigorism"—the doctrine that the very essence of virtue is selfdenial. This doctrine (according to Adam Smith no longer widely
current by Mandeville's time^^ is rooted in that dogma of Christianity
which maintains that since the fall of man (when Adam and Eve first
contravened God's express commands and thereby introduced sin into
the world) human nature is essentially flawed. Virtue must therefore
consist not in acting in conformity with natural impulses but in
subduing and counteracting them. According to Mandeville's account
of the origin of virtue, the apparent battle we wage against our passions
is rather a conflict between pride and the other passions. This pride is
never truly subdued but is so fully gratified that we are more than
adequately compensated for the privations which, for the public good,
we voluntarily impose on our other passions. Though Adam Smith,
writing three decades later, pointed out the ambiguity of Mandeville's
use of the term pride,which can range from an entirely proper degree
of self-respect to inordinate vanity, the only one of his contemporary
critics to show similar awareness of this equivocation was Richard
Fiddes.^' Law and Thorold conspicuously failed to appreciate this
ambiguity and were therefore particularly outraged by Mandeville's
attempt to found morality on pride—an enterprise which to them
seemed to imply a contradiction in terms and to be a particularly gross
affront to Christianity, which accounts humility a virtue.^®
As Mandeville himself admitted in his last work, A Letter to Dion
(1732),^^ he had deliberately adopted the subtitle Private Vices, Publick
Benefits for its provocative effea. Mandeville's critics frequently failed
to realize that it should be interpreted in the light of his rigoristic
definition of virtue; but this failure is easily understood and readily
excused when one bears in mind the gleeful enthusiasm with which
" Rigorism is expressly repudiated by Law [PVPB 63-72] and by Fiddes [Ihid-WOl, and Bluet
declares it to be inconsistent witb the gospel of Christ [Ibid. 312-13].
" PVPB 632.
" PVPB 629-30.
"PVPB 110-11.
"PVPB 63 and417-20.
" PVPB 595.
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Mandeville points out that even vice as ordinarily conceived (for
example, drunkenness, prostitution and burglary) is of benefit to
someone. It therefore seemed to his critics that there was no enormity
which he was unwilling to justify.
Those critics of Mandeville whose opposition was rooted in their
faith saw the Fable not only as hostile to Christianity and therefore
morally subversive but also as politically dangerous to a high degree;
for they all—be they Tory or Whig—entertained views as to the
interdependent nature of religion, morality, and the legitimacy of
government which were contradicted by the doctrines propounded in
the Fable. William Law, in a succinct exposition of the orthodoxy of
his day, declared morality to be immutable, rooted in the nature of
things, apprehended by reason, and binding even on God himself
(though further enforced by his will)." Society and government
likewise were thought to be directly instituted by God, or at least
sanctioned by him; and man (formed in God's image) to be an
inherently sociable creature. Mandeville, on the other hand—at least
in the more extreme pronouncements which pervade part I of the
Fable—emphasized man's animal nature rather than his rationality;
declared morality to be as whimsical and arbitrary as sartorial fashion;
maintained that virtue is the contrivance of skilful politicians who have
worked on human pride; that society and government were the
products of political artifice and trickery; and that man in his prepolitical state was rapacious and selfish. It is therefore not surprising
that these first critics of Mandeville, writing from an avowedly
Christian perspective, often expressed themselves with great ardor; for
they perceived in him a threat to their faith, their ethics and their
politics.
The years 1725 and 1726 saw the publication of two works unlike
the five already alluded to and unlike each other except that both were
published anonymously: namely George Bluet's An Enquiry whether
a General Practice of Virtue tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or
Disadvantage of a People and The True Meaning of the Fable of the Bees.
Both these works display a detailed knowledge of Mandeville's text and
a subtlety of analysis unequalled elsewhere. Moreover, they are
primarily negative in that they concentrate on highlighting faults in

" PVPB 59-61.
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Mandeville's work but devote little or no space to advancing positive
doctrines of their own. Bluet does clearly state that the best foundation
for morality is Christianity^'—an assumption he shared with the earlier
writers—but The True Meaning of the Fable of the Bees (a tract which is
exclusively devoted to a single thesis) does not raise the issue.
Nothing is known for certain about "George Bluet," not even his
name. The only available information is conjectural and contained in
a note by F. B. Kaye'*. Whoever this author was, Bluet's Enquiry is
by far the most thorough and detailed criticism of the Fable, and at
almost 65,000 words it is also the longest. 0ohn Dennis's comes second
at about 35,000 words.) It includes seven sections on the nature of
wealth; Mandeville's account of the origin of society; luxury; duelling;
Mandeville's treatment of morality and religion; prostitution; and
charity schools. Bluet ruthlessly exposes the inconsistencies and
contradiaions to be found both within the Fable and between that and
Mandeville's other books. He examines the authorities to which he
resorts and shows that some of his appeals are unwarranted, since they
do not support him when they are restored to their context. He reveals
Mandeville's identity as the author of the Fable and of his other
anonymously published books, namely A Treatise on the Hypochondriack and Flysterick Passions (1711), The Virgin Unmask'd (1709) and
Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness (1720)''.
All these constitute reasons why Bluet's Enquiry is important.
The authorship of The True Meaning of the Fable of the Bees has
never been established, though it has been erroneously attributed to
Mandeville himself. This ascription is highly implausible: not so much
(as F. B. Kaye claimed") because it rests upon a serious misunderstand
ing of Mandeville's intentions but rather because, contrary to Kaye's
infelicitous suggestion that it is a defence of the Fable, it is rather a
trenchant critique, logical and moral, such as Mandeville would never
have penned against his own work. (Any doubt about this can be
dissipated simply by reading the first two pages or the last two.)
"PVPB 355-56.
24
writings of Bernard Mandeville—A Bibliogiapliical Survey," Journal of En^ish and
Germanic Philology VoL 20 (1921), 419-67, pages 461-2. See PVPB 229-30, where the relevant
footnote is reproduced infull.
^ PVPB 277, 294,316,363, and 371-72.
"The Writings of Bernard MandeviDe: A Bibliographical Survey," Journal of English and
GetmanicPhilology 20 (1921): 419-67, 463-64.
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Though written ostensibly in response to Bluet's Enquiry, it is in hot
a direct commentary on the Fable itself. At almost 30,000 words, it is
the third longest of the immediate responses and exhibits a close
familiarity with Mandeville's text and an attention to detail which are
rivalled only by Bluet. The author claims: "I have read him throughly
and throughly" and "I was forc'd to read the book over and over again
before I cou'd make any thing of it."^^
In "An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue" Mandeville
defines virtue and vice thus:
...they agreed...to call every thing, which, without Regard to
the Publick, Man should commit to gratify any of his Appe
tites, VICE; if in that Action there cou'd be observed the least
prospect, that it might be injurious to any of the Society, or
ever render him less serviceable to others: And to give the
Name of VIRTUE to every Performance, by which Man,
contrary to the Impulse of Nature, should endeavour the
Benefit of others, or the Conquest of his own Passions out of
a Rational Ambition of being good.^'
This definition incorporates both utilitarian and rigoristic elements,
and it is on the former that The True Meaning concentrates to the
exclusion of the latter, misidentifying the "infallible touchstone" of
which Mandeville speaks in his Vindication as a utilitarian criterion
rather than a rigoristic one, and maintaining, quite rightly, that what
is defined as harmful to the public cannot at the same time be a public
benefit, but failing to point out that private conduct prompted by
spontaneous natural impulses may well accord with public welfare.
The work then proceeds to argue that the vicious social arrangements
which the Fable champions (its author's denials and protestations
notwithstanding) are conducive not to the general good but to the
benefit of a political elite, whose status was established and continues
to be maintained by an imposture on the lower classes of people.
Whether or not this is "the true meaning" of the Fable, it is an interpre
tation which is ingeniously supported by considerable textual evidence
2' pVPB 440 and 467. JoLn Dennis, by contrast, embarked on his fierce diatribe after only one
or two readings (see PVPB 184).
"FB 1:48-49.
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evincing Mandeville's callous and contemptuous attitude to the plight
of the poor. (See especially Part H.)
Kaye claims that "the contradiction which the True Meaning is
trying to explain has no existence," but this is only half true. There are
at least very serious logical tensions between the rigorism which
Mandeville insincerely professed and the utilitarianism which, on
Kaye's own admission, was the real driving force that inspired his
writings.^' The inconsistency lies in the fact that the gratification of
appetite is condemned by the rigoristic criterion but endorsed by the
utilitarian one, hence the paradox of private vices proving beneficial at
least to someone. The True Meaning of the Fable of the Bees was the first
work to focus on this incongruity and attempt to resolve it. Like Kaye,
its author saw that Mandeville's professions of rigorism were insincere
but explained them as an integral part of the conspiracy to induce the
vulgar to practice self-denial in order that the members of a political
elite might more fully indulge their appetites.
Although for its time it presented an unusual perspective on
Mandeville and is composed in a light and easy-going style, The True
Meaning of the Fable of the Bees is as perspicacious and astute a piece of
writing as any of the contemporary criticisms of Mandeville. I find it
surprising that Kaye thought it unworthy of mention in the appendix
where he summarizes and comments on the works of Mandeville's
principal critics.'" Among the contradictions which it exposes and
discusses are Mandeville's claim that men are wholly selfish and yet feel
pity and gratitude; that if there are no such things in nature as real
worth and excellence, then pride has no proper objects and therefore,
along with its converse, shame, it is always irrational; that where there
is no offensive fighting, there can be no defensive; and that the phrase
rational ambition of being good (which Mandeville deploys as part of his
definition of virtue) can have no meaning which is consistent with his
egoistic psychology or his conspiratorial account of the origin of
virtue."
I esteem it particularly significant that, without exception, all of
Mandeville's immediate contemporaries saw his conspiratorial thesis of

® See his note on A Letter to Dion reproduced in PVPB 575-56.
"FB II 401-17
" PVPB 480-81, 482, 489-90, and 495-96.
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the origin of morality and of society not as a "fictive literary device"^^
but as a literal and mischievously false account. This is why Robert
Burrow denounced it in his sermon preached before the Lord Mayor,
the very title of which is Civil Society and Government vindicatedfrom
the charge of being founded on, and preserv'd by. Dishonest Arts. William
Law criticized it at length in the first section of his work'^; it was
attacked by Richard Fiddes in his Preface; both John Dennis and
George Bluet devoted an entire section of their books to its repudia
tion; and its imputation to Mandeville as a crucial part of his doctrine
is the principal contention of The True Meaning of the Fable of the Bees.
Indeed, there is no thesis in the first part of the Fable which was more
persistently, more vigorously, or more cogently criticized than the
conspiratorial account of the origin of virtue and the foundation of
society. Moreover, as all these works were printed in London, it is
most unlikely that any of them would have escaped Mandeville's
notice.
I therefore submit that it is highly probable that the evolutionary
thesis which in Part II of the Fable replaced the discredited conspirato
rial thesis was a conscious response (albeit unacknowledged as such'^)
to this well-founded and often pointedly focused criticism. Part 11 of
the Fable should therefore be seen not merely as an elaboration and
defence of the doctrines contained in the earlier volume but as a

Tkat tLe conspiratoiial account of the origin of society was never meant to be taken literally
but was intended as a fictive literary device to encompass the evolutionary process which
Mandeville alwayshad in mind wasmaintained by F. B.Kaye (FBIIxiv-lxvi) andhas beenmore
recently defended by Maurice Goldsmilli in his Private Vices, Public Benefits—Bernard
Mandeville*sSocialandPolitical'ThoughtlpzvcAynd.%e\}myer%{xYVress, 1985).Ihave criticized this
thesis at greater length in my General Introduction to Private Vices, PuHick Ben^tsf: The
Contemporary Reception of Bernard Mandeville, PVPB xvi-xviii.
In the Third Dialogue of Part II of the Falde Cleomenes, apparently responding—or rather
expressly declining to respond—to Law's challenge (PVPB 57-58) to specify the time and place
when society wasestablished by a politicalimposture says:"When Ihave aMind to dive intothe
Origin of any Maxim or political Invention, for the Use of Society in general, I don't trouble
my Head with enquiring after the Time or Country, in which it was first heard of...but I go
directly to the Fountain Head, human Nature itselP (FB 11128).
In ri Letter to Dion, Mandeville says that since no criticism has appeared "that mi^ht not be
easily answerid from the FaMe ofthe Bees it self or the Vindication... I have not hitherto thought
fit to take any notice of any" (PVPB 591). The remark is characteristically ambiguous; for by
the time it was written in 1732, Part II of theFahle had been published. Accordingly, It could be
interpreted to mean that nofurther replies are necessary beyondwhat are contained in hods parts
of the Fahle and the Vindication.
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significant and substantial improvement upon them'^—a development
due, I believe, to the influence of the immediate critics of the Fable and
a reason why they are so important; for by provoking Mandeville to
respond, they prompted him to revise and develop his social theory and
to make improvements which profoundly influenced his successors. In
particular, Hume's account of the development of society and the
evolution of the rules which govern it from the experience of primitive
families owes much to Part 11 of the Fabled'
No treatment of Mandeville's contemporary critics could be
complete without mention of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746). Of the
immediate respondents to the Fable he was arguably the most impor
tant, but he needs to be treated separately from the aforementioned
writers. His hostility to Mandeville (sometimes expressed with great
vehemence) stemmed almost entirely from his opposition to his egoistic
psychology. Like Mandeville, he believed that morality was founded on
human nature rather than on some ulterior supra-sensory reality,'^ but
unlike Mandeville he believed that our original God-given make-up was
fundamentally benevolent and qualified man for the moral and social
life without the mediation of political artifice. Also, unlike any of
Mandeville's other contemporary critics, Hutcheson was a considerable
figure in the history of ethics,'' being a professor at Glasgow University
and the author of highly original books. He exerted a great and
enduring influence not only through his own writings but by his
personal association with his fellow Scots, David Hume and Adam
Smith. In 1739-40 Hume consulted him about possible revisions to the

In. liis recent book E. J. Himdeit contends tbat in Part II egoism is reconceptualized as selfliking tomeet the objections of critics. It is no less reasonableto maintainthat the evolutionaiy
thesis was similaiiy a response to criticism. E.J. Himdert: The Enlightenment's FaHe: Bernard
Mandeville and the Discovery ofSociety (Cambridge Universiiy Press, 1993) 54-55. A subsequent
remark indicates that Hundert concurs with my view that it was the hostiliiy to which the FaMe
was subjectedwhich precipitated the evolutionaiy response; **Havii^adopted that aggressively
evolutionaiy stancewhich characterized his writingin the wake of theFaUe's stormy reception
after 1723..." (62).
David Hume: A Treatise of Hume Nature (1739-40), book III, part II, section II.
See my "Hutcheson, Hume and the Ontology of Morals," Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 19
(1985) 133-51. Reprinted in my Essays on Sexuality and Ethics (Ismeron: Solihull, 1995).
Of less importance than Hutcheson but more enduringly influential than Mandeville^s other
critics was Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752), a selection of whose sermons was published in
1726. It is debatablewhether he should be coxmtedas one of Mandeville's critics sincehe never
alludes eitherto bim or to the FaUe by name. However, there can be littledoubt that the choice
of sermons included in this volume was influenced by the controversy raging at the time.
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then unpublished book JRoiA Treatise of Human Nature, and in 1743
he wrote to thank him for and to comment upon a complimentary
copy of a recently published book." Adam Smith was a student at
Glasgow between 1737 and 1740 and readily acknowledged his
indebtedness to "the never to be forgotten Dr. Hutcheson."^ It is
most likely that it was through him that Smith first became aware of
Mandeville, some of whose ideas (For example, laissez faire and the
division of labor) he subsequently adopted.^'
While the influences which stirred Hutcheson were numerous and
wide-ranging, there can be no doubt that in the mid 1720s, when he was
engaged in composing his most original works, he was particularly pre
occupied with Mandeville as the most notorious contemporary
exponent of the egoistic psychology he so deeply deplored. He first
criticized the Fable in An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty
and Virtue
the title page of the first edition of which states that
in the book "the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are...defended
against the author of the Fable of the Bees." However, his most succinct
and trenchant criticism of Mandeville is to be found in three letters
published in consecutive issues of The Dublin Weekly foumal in
February, 1726."
I have aimed to show the significant role played by Mandeville's
critics in the development of ethical theory. Though such a conse
quence was diametrically opposite to what they intended, Mandeville's
critics, most of whom were inspired by a sense of outrage rooted in

" Four letters from Hume to Hutcheson are printed in vol. I of The Letters of David Hume,
edited by J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932).
" Smith deployed this phrase in a letter written in November, 1787, nearly fifty years alter his
student daysin Glasgow and less than three years before his own death. The Correspondence of
Adam Smith edited by E. C. Mossner and I. k Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 309.
"SeeChapter4ofIanSimpsonRoss's The Life ofAdam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995);
also W. L. Taylor: Francis Hutcheson and David Humeas Predecessors of Adam Smith (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965).
Not in his letter to the London Journal published in two consecutive weekly parts in
November, 1724. Kayeseems to have been the first to identify this as being by Hutcheson (FB
II 420) hut misleadingly says in a footnote (FB II 345) that it was here that Hutcheson first
attacked the PaUe. The main theme of this article is the inadequacy of contemporary ethical
theories. It does not mention the FaUe nor does it incorporate anydiscussion of doctrines which
ate characteristically Mandevillean.It was notincluded in the facsimile edition of Hutdieson's
Collected Works (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 7 vols, 1969-71), hut a modernized text is included
inTwo Texts on Human Nature edited by Thomas Mautner (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
« PVPB 389-407.
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their piety, contributed significantly to the secularization and rational
ization of ethics by rendering the Fable so controversial that within five
years of the 1723 edition Mandeville was spurred to compose Part 11, in
which he effectively countered their best founded objections by moving
away from the conspiratorial account of the origin of society and of
morality towards the more plausible and innovative evolutionary
explanation which he came to prefer. Francis Hutcheson was a
committed theist and even an orthodox Christian, but like Mandeville
he espoused a naturalistic ethical theory which was relative to human
nature and therefore a suitable subject for empirical inquiry. The
account which he proposed of a primitive and non-analysable moral
sense based on a native benevolence was an important precursor of the
more explanatory psychological theories subsequently developed by
Hume and later by Herbert Spencer.^''

See my"Hume,Spencer and tkeStandard
Philosophy 58 (1983):39-55 and."E^oi5m
and Rigoiism: Spencer*s Resolution of a Moral Paradox." Both arein my Essays onSexurdity and
Ethics (Solihull: Ismeron, 1995).

